We study how the EU enlargement in 2004 and the Great Recession in the late 2000s have shaped the scale and composition of migration flows from the New Member States to Germany. We demonstrate that immigration increased substantially despite the restrictions on the German labor market, and that net flows decreased to zero at the outset of the recession. The cohorts arriving after 2004 had on average a lower education than the previous arrival cohort, but the wage gap compared to Germans became narrower over time. Almost 10 years after EU enlargement, we re-assess the transitional arrangements, and argue that Germany would have been better off, had it immediately opened its labor market. Finally, the Great recession allows us to study how effective migration within the EU is as an adjustment mechanism. Our data clearly show an increase in immigration from countries that were hit by the crisis, although the annual net flows are still too small to significantly reduce unemployment in the countries hit by the crisis.
I. Introduction
Almost a decade has passed since the Eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2004.
Germany has been a special case among the old member states of the EU for at least two reasons.
First, the country restricted access to its labor markets for workers from the New Member States (NMS) until 2011; and second, the German labor market weathered the Great Recession without an increase in unemployment.
i In this chapter we analyze how both events ---EU enlargement and the economic crisis ---shaped migration flows to Germany.
As we will argue, both events changed the attractiveness of Germany as a destination for immigrants.
The labor market restrictions after 2004 made Germany less attractive for migrants compared to countries that opened their labor markets immediately, while we expect the stable labor market during the economic crisis to be a pull factor for migrants from the NMS.
This chapter extends previous work by Brenke, Yuksel and Zimmermann (2009) in two important dimensions. First, by using more complete data, we are able to give a broader perspective on EU enlargement and migration to Germany. The aggregate data allow us to document a significant surge in immigration from the NMS to Germany after 2009. Moreover, a comparison with immigration from the old member states suggests that the surge in immigration was mainly driven by the recession and to a lesser extent by the end of the transitional arrangements. Second, we are able to compare the characteristics and the economic success of three cohorts of immigrants from the NMS: those who came before EU enlargement, those who came right after, and those who came during the recession. Also, we can track earlier arrival cohorts over time and analyze their assimilation patterns.
We begin by analyzing aggregate migration flows to and from Germany. EU enlargement mostly changed inflows. Despite the restrictions on the German labor market, immigration from the EU8 and EU2 countries increased significantly after the enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007. ii The
Great Recession , by contrast, had no impact on inflows but a strong impact on outflows, especially 
II. Between EU enlargement and the "labor market miracle": immigration to Germany in the 2000s
Before we turn to the analysis of migration flows throughout the 2000s, it is useful to look at two important institutional and economic developments that affected the German labor market and shaped migration flows to and from Germany.
The first important institutional development was the introduction of transitional arrangements after the enlargement round in 2004, according to which the old member states were allowed to restrict access to their labor markets for workers from the NMS until 2011. The German government opted for these labor market restrictions and kept them in place until 2011.
iii The restrictions made Germany a less attractive destination compared to countries that opened their labor markets immediately. While free movement of workers is a core principle of the European Union, the German government was concerned that an expected large inflow of low-skilled workers from the NMS would increase unemployment, and impose a burden on the welfare state. The restrictions applied in principle to all workers, but excluded students, self-employed workers, and seasonal workers on a short-term contract. Not surprisingly, the introduction of the transitional arrangements led to a diversion of migration flows away from Germany and towards the UK and
Ireland, who had not opted for the constraints. While in 2000, around 80% of all EU8 migrants in the EU lived in Germany and Austria, after 2004 the majority lived in the UK and Ireland (Boeri & Brücker, 2001; Baas & Brücker, 2012) .
[Figure 1 about here]
A second important development was the worldwide economic crisis, which hit the German economy after 2008, but which left the German labor market largely unaffected. As Figure 1 shows, GDP per capita dropped by about 5% from 2008 to 2009 and recovered thereafter, while the unemployment rate remained stable. The favorable labor market conditions during the crisis made Germany a more attractive destination relative to other European countries that were hit harder by the financial crisis. In particular, the labor market position of migrants had improved with the reform policies early in the 2000s.
With these observations in mind, we now turn to the aggregate inflows to Germany in Figure   2 . The flow data is taken from the Central Registry of Foreigners (Ausländerzentralregister) and covers all foreign nationals that register or de-register in Germany in a given year. Both immigration and emigration flows reflect lower bounds, as the inflows may not capture seasonal workers that come to Germany for a short spell, while outflows may be under-stated because people did not deregister, although they are legally obliged to. From the inflows it is less clear how the economic crisis has affected migration to Germany.
On the one hand, the number of Polish immigrants dropped, but the number of Romanians and Bulgarians increased at the same time. Unlike Poles, they were not allowed to move freely to the UK after enlargement. A more conclusive picture emerges from the net flows in the graph on the right in To disentangle the increase in migration due to the opening of the German labor market from the increase due to the crisis, it is helpful to compare net flows from the NMS with net flows from other EU countries that were hit hard by the crisis, mainly in Southern Europe. Workers from these countries were allowed to move to Germany throughout the 2000s, so that an increase in inflows from these countries can mainly be attributed to the crisis. In Figure 2 we plot the migration flows of the five countries that were hit hardest by the economic crisis. These countries are often referred to as PIIGS. iv Immigration from PIIGS has been decreasing in the first half of the 2000s, and has been steadily increasing since. The net flows, in contrast, were negative until 2009 and show a sharp increase in2010 and 2011. The increase in migration from countries that were hit by the crisis provide evidence that the stable German labor market is indeed a pull factor for migrants.
III. Who migrated to Germany? III.I. Descriptive evidence
After having looked at the aggregate picture of immigration to Germany, we now turn to the demographics of immigrants from the NMS. As the register data only give aggregate flows by gender, we rely in this section on stock data from the German microcensus. The microcensus is a 1%-random sample of the German population, collected annually by the German Statistical Office. It is a rotating survey without panel structure, in which households are interviewed in four consecutive years.
Individuals are legally obliged to take part in the survey, which ensures a high response rate. For our analysis we use the scientific use files provided by the German Statistical Office.
In this section we want to investigate how the labor market restrictions and the financial crisis changed the characteristics of EU8 immigrants, and how both events affected their labor market outcomes. We compare three arrival cohorts: To make the three cohorts comparable over time, we restrict the data to EU8-migrants. We define as a migrant a citizen from the NMS who migrated to Germany in the respective period. As is common with German data, the migrant definition has to rely on citizenship rather than place of birth.We begin by comparing the descriptive statistics of Germans and immigrants from the three arrival cohorts. In a second step, we systematically compare Germans and EU8-immigrants using regression analysis. also more educated than Germans; they had a higher share among workers with upper secondary or third-level education, and a lower share of workers with a lower secondary education. Over time, the average education of new immigrants changed; after EU enlargement the education level decreased, while it increased again during the crisis, when relatively more migrants with a third-level degree came.
[ Table 1 about here]
EU enlargement clearly changed the employment patterns of migrants. Given that self- cohort earned 75%. One explanation for the earnings gap between immigrants and Germans is the difference in work experience; migrants may earn less than Germans, as they are on average younger. Another explanation is sector and industry affiliation. Immigrants may cluster in low-paid jobs, especially if they do not have location-specific skills or access to networks that provide information on better job opportunities.
In sum, migrants from the NMS have a higher education than Germans, but they are more likely to be self-employed, more concentrated in blue-collar jobs, and earn less than the average German worker. At least two explanations can be given for the discrepancy between earnings and education. One factor is down-skilling. Immigrants may initially accept a job for which they are overqualified and move on to better-paid jobs at a later stage (Chiswick & Miller, 2010; Piracha & Vadean, 2013) . Another explanation is the imperfect comparability of educational degrees. Given education is self-reported, migrants may misreport their education. And even if they correctly state their education, a university degree from their home country may not have the same value with German employers than a German degree.
III.II. Regression analysis: a closer look
It is difficult to assess the magnitude of down-skilling based on descriptive statistics, because migrants and natives differ in observable and unobservable skills. In this section we compare EU8-immigrants and Germans with the same observable characteristics, such as age, education, and gender, and sector. We do so by running an OLS regression of the variable of interest ---education or wages ---on a set of arrival cohort dummies and several control variables that capture systematic differences in wages with respect to age and gender. Germans are the base category, so that the coefficients can be interpreted as the difference between immigrants and Germans of the same age and gender. By introducing additional controls, such as sector fixed effects, we can make a comparison of migrants and Germans with similar characteristics within the same sector, and see whether the education and wage gaps can be explained by the sorting of migrants into low-paid jobs.
As we have multiple census rounds, we can track earlier arrival cohorts over time, and see how their outcomes have changed with duration of stay.
[ Table 2 about here]
We first compare the years of education of EU8 migrants and Germans in Panel A of Table 2 .
As Next we analyze the wage gap between immigrants and natives in Panel B of are smaller in magnitude than in Columns 1-3, which indicates that migrants tend to sort into lowpaid jobs. Once they are compared to Germans in the same sector and with the same education, the earnings gap becomes smaller.
In sum, migration flows from the NMS to Germany have changed in scale as well as in demographics. The two cohorts arriving after EU enlargement were significantly different from the cohort that moved to Germany right before the enlargement. While all cohorts had a higher average education than Germans, post-enlargement immigrants had less education than immigrants that arrived before 2004. Yet, post-enlargement immigrants earned more on average.
vii A potential concern is that the difference between the cohorts may be due to sample selection. Although the micro-census is representative for the entire population living in Germany at the time of the survey, it possibly under-counts temporary workers who only stay in Germany for a few weeks. If temporary workers ---for example those working in agriculture or construction ---are less skilled than non-temporary workers, then we are possibly over-estimating the earnings and education of later cohorts. By introducing sector fixed effects, we can reduce this bias. The similar results with and without sector fixed effects indicate that the possible selection bias is negligible.
IV. What can we learn from the German case? IV.I. Was Germany right to restrict its labor markets?
Before EU enlargement, Germany decided to restrict its labor market for workers from the NMS in accordance with the transitional arrangements, and only lifted the restrictions once it was legally obliged to in 2011. In light of the results from the previous section, the question arises whether, in hindsight, these restrictions were beneficial for Germany. were not the first enlargement rounds, they were historically unique due to the large income differences between the old and new member states, which were much larger than in the case of Spain and Portugal in the 1980s. Given these income differences, it was not surprising that EU enlargement triggered an unprecedented migration wave, with around 6% of the Polish, Latvian, and Slovak, and 9% of the Lithuanian workforce emigrating after 2004 (Elsner, 2011 (Elsner, , 2013 ).
While we cannot exactly say how many migrants would have come to Germany in absence of the restrictions, the data indicate that the restrictions led to migration diversion. Instead of moving to Germany, migrants from the NMS mainly went to the UK and Ireland, which had a booming economy at the time, and which opened their labor markets in 2004. Given that Germany is geographically close to the NMS, and given that the majority of immigrants from the NMS were living in Germany before EU enlargement, it is plausible that immigration would have been higher without the restrictions.
Besides the scale of immigration, the transitional arrangements may have also influenced the skill composition of migrants. When we compare the characteristics of EU8 migrants to Germany with those of migrants to the UK, we can see two important differences: migrants to the UK were on average 6 years younger and their share of workers with a third-level degree was 12 percentage points higher. viii Despite these differences, it is not clear how many younger and better-educated immigrants would have gone to Germany instead of the UK.
Suppose for a moment that, without the restrictions, more, younger, and better educated immigrants from the EU8 countries mostly competed with previous immigrants and not with natives.
For Germany as a whole, the costs of the restrictions exceeded the benefits by far.
IV.II. Is migration a suitable adjustment mechanism?
In the previous section we looked at Germany in isolation and evaluated whether migration restrictions were beneficial for the country. When we shift our focus to the entire EU, free migration certainly brings economic benefits. First, it leads to efficiency gains, as workers can move to places where they are most productive. Second, migration can serve as an adjustment mechanism that helps absorbing asymmetric shocks.
A good example for an asymmetric shock is the recent financial crisis, which hit Southern Europe more than Germany. Take the example of Spain, which experienced a deep recession and a sharp increase in unemployment. Given that Spain is part of a monetary union, it cannot devalue its currency, so that it has to devalue internally by cutting wages and prices. If wages are rigid, then internal devaluation results in higher unemployment. Migration from Spain to Germany could reduce the burden that comes with internal devaluation and would take pressure off Spanish wages. Even if two countries are not part of a monetary union ---for example Germany and Poland ---migration can help absorbing asymmetric shocks.
Based on the German experience, can we conclude that migration is an effective adjustment mechanism? To answer this question, we return to the aggregate migration flows in Figure 2 The aggregate flows to Germany give evidence that migration does respond to asymmetric shocks. Workers from crisis-hit countries move to countries with more favorable economic conditions. So far, the increase in migration during the recession is far from being large, but it can further increase if unemployment in Southern Europe remains high. The annual net migration of 40,000 workers from Southern Europe in 2011, however, is too small to substantially reduce the pressure on the labor markets in the source countries.
Migration rates can be low for multiple reasons: language and cultural differences, the difference in the formal requirements for certain occupations (e.g. lawyers), and preferences to stay Second, evidence suggests that the recent surge in immigration from the NMS is mainly driven by the recession, and to a lesser extent by the expiration of the transitional arrangements.
This can be seen from a comparison with inflows from Southern Europe, which show the same pattern as inflows from the NMS. As workers from Southern Europe were allowed to migrate to Germany throughout the 2000s, the surge in immigration from this region can be attributed to the crisis.
Third, immigrants from the NMS had a higher education than comparable natives, but they earned considerably less. These results hold when we compare both groups within the same sector and the same education group. Over time, the over-education of immigrants increased, while the immigrant-native wage gap became more narrow.
Based on our findings, we conclude that Germany would have been better off had it opened its labor markets in 2004. By opting for the transitional arrangements, the country missed out on an inflow of young and well-educated workers who went to the UK and Ireland instead.
The recent surge in immigration to Germany ---especially from countries that were hit hard by the recession ---show that migration can indeed work as an adjustment mechanism, and help to absorb asymmetric shocks.
Our findings open several directions for future research. One important topic is the potential role of migration in absorbing asymmetric shocks. As a first step, it would be important to establish the optimal level of bilateral migration flows if migration was the only adjustment mechanism. The optimal level of migration can then serve as a benchmark to which one could compare current migration flows. If more migration is desirable, it should be possible to design policies that increase migration flows within Europe and elsewhere.
Another important research topic related to this chapter is temporary and circular migration.
The aggregate data show a strong response of outflows to macroeconomic fundamentals. While we are able to quantify how the recession shapes the scale and composition of migration flows, we would require more detailed data to look at the duration of stay of migrants. For the design of migration policy it would be important to quantify the extent of circular migration, to uncover the underlying selection patterns, and to identify the drivers of the decision to migrate, and the decision to leave. (0.095)*** (0.094)*** (0.088)*** (0.087)***
